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Introduction
Public sector organizations often strive for multiple goals, most of them being di¢ cult to describe in an objective and precise way (Dixit 2002 ). The multitude and vagueness of public sector organization's goals are also re ‡ected in the way performance of employees is assessed in the public sector. As compared to employees in the private sector, performance assessment in the public sector is relatively rare and, if it exists, often tied to weaker incentives (Burgess and Metcalfe 1999) . As a result, performance of employees in the public sector relies much more on intrinsic motivations than on extrinsic incentives. A key issue therefore is what types of intrinsic motivations are prevalent among public sector employees?
A rich empirical literature in public administration and a recent theoretical literature in economics have addressed this issue. A key …nding from the public administration literature is that more altruistic people are more likely to end up in a public-sector job. 1 The economics literature has studied the interplay between employee compensation packages and self-selection of people with di¤erent motivations to the public sector. 2 A common …nding is that the public sector can promote self-selection of motivated or altruistic employees by o¤ering low pay (Handy and Katz 1998, Delfgaauw and Dur 2007) . Further, several studies have shown that, even if performance assessment in the public sector is perfectly feasible, it can be optimal to provide weak incentives to employees in the public sector so as to extract rents (Besley and Ghatak 2005 , Delfgaauw and Dur 2007 , Francois 2007 ). Providing weak incentives may, however, also imply that the public sector becomes an attractive employer for lazy people (Delfgaauw and Dur 2008) . This paper examines di¤erences in altruism and laziness between employees in the public sector and the private sector. We start our analysis by developing a simple model of sorting to the public sector in an economy 1 See among others Rainey (1982) , Crewson (1997) , Houston (2000 and 2006) , Brewer (2003) , Lewis and Frank (2002) , and Frank and Lewis (2004) . Perry et al. (2010) provide an overview of this literature. 2 See among others Handy and Katz (1998), Francois (2000 and , Besley and Ghatak (2005) , Prendergast (2007) , Dur (2007 and 2008) , Nyborg and Brekke (2011) , and . Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) provide an overview of this literature. 1 where workers di¤er in altruism and laziness. In line with the evidence cited above, we assume that in a public sector job, extrinsic rewards for performance are relatively low (because performance is more di¢ cult to measure) while intrinsic rewards for performance are relatively high (because of the opportunity to contribute to other people's welfare in a public sector job). Our theoretical analysis predicts that a worker's likelihood of working in the public sector increases with his altruism, and increases or decreases with his laziness depending on his altruism. Altruism induces sorting to the public sector because public sector jobs o¤er an opportunity to contribute to other people's welfare. Laziness has a more indirect e¤ect on sorting. As lazy people …nd it costly to work hard, their choice of sector is not so much driven by sectoral di¤erences in rewards for performance, but more by sectoral differences in other bene…ts and costs that are unrelated to e¤ort. Hence, for sel…sh workers, the likelihood of working in the public sector increases with laziness, because more lazy workers more likely forego the high extrinsic rewards for performance in the private sector to enjoy public sector bene…ts that are unrelated to e¤ort (e.g. the base salary). The opposite holds for highly altruistic workers who …nd e¤ort more rewarding in the public sector than in the private sector. These workers more likely forego the high intrinsic rewards for performance in the public sector in return for private sector bene…ts unrelated to e¤ort when they are more lazy. Hence, our theory predicts a negative interaction e¤ect between a worker's altruism and laziness. Depending on the exact parameter values, either workers who are altruistic and energetic or workers who are altruistic and lazy are most likely to sort to a public-sector job. Workers who are sel…sh and energetic are always least likely to sort to the public sector.
We test our theoretical predictions using data from the German SocioEconomic Panel Study (SOEP). The SOEP is a yearly panel that started in 1984 and now covers over 11.000 German households. The rich set of personality measures and demographic variables in the SOEP o¤ers a rare opportunity to study sorting of altruistic and lazy workers to the public sector. Following Becker et al. (2012) , our measure for altruism is the worker's response to the survey question: How important is it for you to "be there for others"? This question was included in the 2004-wave. Our measure for laziness comes from the 2005-wave and is given by the worker's response to the statement: "I see myself as someone who tends to be lazy." We examine how these self-reported personality characteristics are related to sector of employment after controlling for a rich set of demographics.
The results of our empirical analysis are as follows. In line with our predictions, we …nd that the likelihood of working in the public sector is positively and signi…cantly related to a worker's altruism. A one standard-deviation increase in altruism results in a 1.3 percentage-points higher probability of working in the public sector. We …nd a similar result for a worker's laziness, both in size and statistical signi…cance. A one standard-deviation increase in laziness results in a 1.4 percentage-points higher probability of working in the public sector. In contrast to our predictions, we …nd no evidence for an interaction e¤ect between a worker's altruism and laziness. The estimate of the interaction e¤ect is insigni…cant and very close to zero. Our estimates imply that workers who are both altruistic and lazy have the highest likelihood of ending up in the public sector. The predicted probability of a highly altruistic and highly lazy worker of working in the public sector is 33%. Workers who are sel…sh and highly energetic least likely work in the public sector, with a predicted probability of 20%.
Next, we do a series of robustness checks. First, we check whether the results are similar across education levels. In line with previous work for other countries (Lewis and Frank 2002, Dur and Zoutenbier 2010), we …nd stronger e¤ects of altruism (and also of laziness) for better educated workers, with point estimates that are twice as large as those for the full sample. Next, following Gregg et al. (2011) , we examine in how far our results are driven by the overrepresentation of 'caring' jobs in the public sector. Restricting the sample to employees in caring industries, we …nd that altruism becomes twice as important for sorting to the public sector, while we …nd no change in the importance of laziness (though the e¤ect is no longer statistically signi…cant). For employees in non-caring industries, we …nd positive and signi…cant sorting of lazy people to the public sector, but no sorting of altruistic people. These results nicely complement those of Gregg et al. (2011) for the UK, who exploit panel data on self-reported unpaid overtime of employees in for-pro…t and not-for-pro…t caring and non-caring industries.
Lastly, we examine whether the sorting patterns that we …nd are mainly the result of self-selection at the beginning of people's career, or whether the sorting patterns become more pronounced for more experienced employees. Work experience may a¤ect sorting patterns for two reasons. First, initial years of people's careers may be spent on 'job shopping,' with many people holding jobs that are not a good match with their tastes and abilities (as in the models by Johnson 1978 , Jovanovic 1979 , and Neal 1999 . As a result, we would expect weaker sorting patterns for employees with shorter work experience. Second, employees' preferences may adapt to experience, for instance as a result of organizational socialization (Brewer 2008 ). Such preference adaption may result in stronger or weaker sorting patterns depending on how entrants'attitudes di¤er from the prevailing organizational culture. Previous empirical work has found a decline in altruistic motivations with tenure among public sector employees (Blau 1960 . We do not …nd a similar pattern in our data. Public sector employees are more altruistic as compared to their private sector counterparts at the start of their career, and by and large it remains like this throughout their career. However, we do …nd a striking pattern for laziness, with small di¤ererences between public and private sector early in people's career, and big di¤erences later on. To what extent these di¤erences are driven by earlycareer job shopping or preference adaption is, unfortunately, hard to uncover due to the cross-sectional nature of our data.
The SOEP data have been used previously to examine sorting of workers to the public sector. Pfeifer (2011) focuses on risk attitude and …nds clear evidence that people who are more risk averse are more likely to sort to the public sector. We include risk attitude as a control variable in our regressions and …nd a similar result. In addition to risk attitude, Dohmen and Falk (2010) take up a number of broad measures of people's preferences and personality, such as (positive and negative) reciprocity, trust, and all of the 'Big Five'personality indicators. Likewise, Luechinger et al. (2010) include the self-assessed importance of 'having a successful career'and 'being engaged in social and political activities'. In contrast to these studies, our empirical analysis is -inspired by our theory -con…ned to the role of more narrowly de…ned facets of personality, namely altruism and laziness. While the use of broad personality measures such as Big Five is quite common (see e.g. the reviews by Almlund et al. 2011 and Becker et al. 2012 ), these measures have been criticized for being too blunt and for suppressing important underlying facets of personality (Borghans et al. 2008 (Borghans et al. : 1008 (Borghans et al. -1009 . Indeed, several studies in psychology …nd that underlying trait measures do a better job in predicting and explaining behavior and outcomes than the Big Five indicators (e.g. Paunonen and Ashton 2001 and Roberts et al. 2005 ). In line with these …ndings, we …nd pretty strong sorting to the public sector on the basis of the narrowly de…ned traits of altruism and laziness, whereas Dohmen and Falk (2010) and Luechinger et al. (2010) …nd much weaker and often insigni…cant patterns using broader measures of social preferences and conscientiousness.
While the main aim of our study is to contribute to the body of knowledge about the nature and origin of public sector worker's motivations, we believe that our …ndings may also help policy makers to design better HR policies. By learning about employees'intrinsic motivations, HR-specialists are better able to …ne-tune personnel policies in the public sector to the special needs and wishes of the current workforce. Moreover, in the light of our …ndings, policy makers may wish to reconsider current personnel policies so as to attract and retain a di¤erently motivated workforce in the future.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop and analyse a simple model of sorting and derive our key hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and our empirical strategy. The results of the empirical analysis are presented in Section 4. Lastly, Section 5 concludes.
Theory
Building on Delfgaauw and Dur (2008), we develop a simple model of sorting to the public sector. Workers in our model are heterogenous in two ways: they di¤er in altruism, denoted by i 2 [0; ] 0, and in laziness, denoted by
Both characteristics are private information of the individual and are drawn from a continuous distribution. 3 As in Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2008) , altruism in our model is of the impure form. That is, altruistic individuals care about their personal contribution to other people's welfare, not about other people's welfare per se (see Andreoni 1990 ). Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2010) provide …eld-experimental evidence supporting this assumption.
Workers choose their sector of employment, either the private sector or the public sector. The private sector is perfectly competitive such that workers are paid the full marginal product, denoted by p, for each unit of e¤ort. For convenience, we abstract from opportunities to contribute to other people's welfare in the private sector, and so a worker's altruism does not a¤ect his utility when working in the private sector. 4 A worker's laziness enters the worker's utility function through the cost of e¤ort, which is identical across sectors. The utility from working in the private sector is given by:
implying that optimal e¤ort equals:
By substituting optimal e¤ort into the utility function, we obtain the indirect utility from working in the private sector for a worker of type ( i ; i ):
. Thus, a worker's indirect utility from working in the private sector increases in the marginal product of e¤ort and decreases in a worker's laziness.
In contrast to the private sector, a worker's e¤ort in the public sector is unobservable. Hence, workers cannot be paid for performance and, instead, receive a base salary denoted by w. 5 In addition, altruistic workers enjoy a nonpecuniary bene…t equal to i e i from making a contribution to public sector output. Thus, worker's utility from working in the public sector is given by:
implying an optimal level of e¤ort equal to:
The stochastic term " i captures all nonpecuniary sector bene…ts and costs for worker i that are unrelated to his e¤ort. It is drawn from a distribution with CDF F (") = Pr(" i "), PDF f (") > 0, and boundaries " 2 ["; "] such that there is some variation in sector choice for each possible worker type ( ; ). Substituting optimal e¤ort into the utility function gives the indirect utility of working in the public sector for a worker of type
Hence, a worker's indirect utility from working in the public sector is increasing in his altruism and decreasing in his laziness. easy or less costly to contribute to other people's welfare. Huck and Rasul (2010) provide convincing evidence for substantial transaction costs in making charitable donations. 5 Complete absence of performance-related pay is, of course, an extreme assumption and made for convenience only. All of our results hold as long as incentive pay is weaker in the public sector than in the private sector.
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A worker joins the public sector when the utility from working in the public sector is higher than or equal to the utility from working in the private sector:
Hence, the fraction of workers of type ( i ; i ) who choose to work in the public sector is given by:
It immediately follows that the likelihood of choosing a job in the public sector increases in altruism i :
The intuition is straightforward: Higher altruism implies that a job in the public sector becomes intrinsically more rewarding and, hence, more attractive. The e¤ect of a worker's laziness i on the likelihood of choosing a public sector job is described by:
Hence, for relatively sel…sh workers (those with i < p), the likelihood of public sector employment increases with laziness, while the reverse holds for highly altruistic workers (those with i > p). The intuition is as follows. Workers choose sector by comparing extrinsic and intrinsic rewards for performance (p and i ) and other individual-speci…c sector bene…ts that are unrelated to e¤ort or performance (the stochastic term " i and the base salary). The latter bene…ts are more important for sector choice of more lazy workers. The reason is that lazy people …nd it costly to work hard and so they gain less utility when e¤ort becomes more rewarding (intrinsically or extrinsically). Consequently, a sel…sh worker's likelihood of working in the public sector increases in his laziness, because a more lazy worker more likely foregoes the extrinsic rewards for performance in the private sector to enjoy the public sector's bene…ts that are unrelated to e¤ort (). The opposite holds for a highly altruistic worker. His likelihood of choosing the public sector decreases with his laziness, as a more lazy worker more likely chooses to forego the high intrinsic rewards for performance in the public sector to enjoy private sector's bene…ts that are unrelated to e¤ort (represented by " i ).
Combined these comparative statics imply that workers who are sel…sh and energetic are least likely to sort to the public sector. If the type space is su¢ ciently rich (more precisely, if > p), then workers who are altruistic and energetic are most likely to work in the public sector, followed by workers who are altruistic and lazy. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . 6 If the type space is smaller such that < p, then the e¤ect of laziness on the likelihood of public sector employment is positive for all possible values of altruism. Hence, in that case, workers who are altruistic and lazy are most likely to sort to the public sector, see Figure 2 .
Data and empirical strategy
We test our predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel study (SOEP), conducted by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin). The SOEP is an unbalanced panel, containing yearly survey data. The …rst wave was conducted in 1984. The survey includes questions on employment, earnings, health, and -in recent waves -a rich set of personality measures. The SOEP covers over 11.000 German households and 20.000 people living in these households.
Our key variables of interest are questions on stated altruism, laziness, and sector of employment. We measure altruism by the response to the question: "[How important] are the following things (Be there for others) currently for you?" Respondents rated themselves on a four-point scale, ranging from "not at all important" to "very important". 7 Laziness is measured by the response to the statement: "I see myself as someone who tends to be lazy". The response is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from "does not apply to me at all" to "applies to me perfectly". Lastly, respondents indicated whether they are employed in the public sector by the question: "Does the company in which you are employed belong to the public sector?" 6 In creating Figure 1 (and Figure 2 ) the stochastic term " is assumed to follow a continuous uniform distribution on the interval ["; "]. The …gures look similar with other distributions as long as second-order e¤ects through f 0 ( ) are not dominant. 7 The same measure for altruism is used in Becker et al. (2012) , who study the relation between economic preferences and personality measures from psychology.
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A limitation of the dataset is that we cannot infer whether a worker who does not work in the public sector is employed in a for-pro…t or not-for-pro…t organization. If not-for-pro…t organizations o¤er similar types of jobs as the public sector, our coe¢ cients of interest are biased towards zero.
We
We use a Linear Probability Model to estimate the probability that a worker with given altruism and laziness is employed in the public sector instead of the private sector. 8 We control for a number of demographics such as gender, age, education, nationality, marital status, number of children, and state of residence. 9 Additionally, we control for worker's risk preferences, as in Dohmen and Our regression speci…cation is:
where A represents our measure of altruism, L is our measure of laziness, and the vector x contains all control variables. In line with our theoretical model we expect a positive e¤ect of laziness (! + ' A > 0) for low values of altruism and a negative e¤ect of laziness (! + ' A < 0) for high values of altruism. This implies that the conditional e¤ect of laziness should be positive, ! > 0, and the interaction e¤ect of altruism and laziness should be negative, ' < 0. Next, we expect a positive e¤ect of altruism for all values of laziness ( + ' L > 0); that is, we expect > 0 to be su¢ ciently large as compared to ' < 0. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample. Public sector workers score themselves slightly higher as compared to private sector workers on altruism, laziness, and risk aversion. There are considerable di¤erences between public sector workers and private sector workers in socio-demographic variables. Public sector workers are on average more likely to be female, older, higher educated, a German citizen, married, and have less children as compared to private sector workers. Table 2 shows correlations between the independent variables. Laziness shows a small but signi…cant negative correlation with both altruism and risk aversion. The correlation between altruism and risk aversion is insigni…cant. Further, the table shows that our personality characteristics correlate with gender and age, suggesting that it is important to control for these demographics in the regression. Table 3 shows the estimation results of the linear probability model using the full sample. The coe¢ cient estimates show the change in the decimal probability of working in the public sector instead of the private sector given a unit change in the independent variable. We report robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity resulting from the binary structure of our response variable.
Results
The …rst column shows the estimation results without taking up any control variables as well as without allowing for a possible interaction e¤ect between altruism and laziness. The estimation results show that the likelihood that a worker is employed in the public sector is increasing in his altruism. This e¤ect is positive and signi…cant. A unit increase in altruism increases the likelihood of working in the public sector instead of the private sector by 3.3 percentage points. We …nd a weaker result for laziness. A unit increase in laziness has a positive but insigni…cant e¤ect (p = 0:117) of 0.5 percentage points on the likelihood of working in the public sector. 10 Next, we control for socio-demographics and risk preferences in column 2. The e¤ect of a worker's altruism is robust in both sign and signi…cance; the magnitude of the e¤ect slightly decreases from 3.3 to 2.4 percentage points. We now also …nd a positive and highly signi…cant e¤ect of a worker's laziness on sector of employment. A unit increase in laziness results in a 0.9 percentage point increase in the likelihood of working in the public sector. The increase in the magnitude of the coe¢ cient stems mainly from the inclusion of age and gender as control variables. Older people and females on average claim to be less lazy (see Table 2 ) as well as have a higher likelihood of working in the public sector (see Table 1 ). Omission of these control variables gave rise to a downward bias in the coe¢ cient for laziness in column 1.
As discussed in the previous section, altruism is measured on a fourpoint scale whereas laziness is measured on a seven-point scale. To make a better comparison of e¤ect sizes between altruism and laziness, we compute standardized coe¢ cients. We compare the e¤ect of a one standard deviation change in the independent variable on the likelihood of working in the public sector. We …nd that the e¤ect sizes of altruism and laziness are similar in magnitude. An increase by one standard deviation in altruism results in a 1.3 percentage point increase in the probability of working in the public sector. A one standard deviation increase in laziness results in a 1.4 percentage point increase in the probability of working in the public sector. These results suggest that altruism and laziness are equally important in determining a worker's sector of employment.
Several of our control variables turn out to be important in explaining a worker's sector of employment. In line with the literature on risk preferences, we …nd that workers who are more risk averse are signi…cantly more likely to work in the public sector instead of the private sector. A unit increase in risk aversion results in a 0.5 percentage points higher likelihood of working in the public sector. This corresponds to a standardized e¤ect size that is slightly smaller than the standardized e¤ect sizes for altruism and laziness. Additionally, we …nd that public sector employees are more likely to be female, older, better educated, and have fewer kids. The state dummies, which control for unobserved heterogeneity between states, are jointly signi…cant (p < 0:01).
Column 3 of Table 3 adds the interaction of altruism and laziness. In contrast to our theoretical predictions, we do not …nd evidence for an interaction e¤ect between a worker's altruism and laziness. The estimate of the coe¢ cient is insigni…cant and very close to zero. 11 This implies that not the highly altruistic and energetic workers have the highest likelihood of being employed in the public sector, but those workers who are altruistic and lazy. Our estimates imply that they face a probability of working in the public sector of 32.8%. 12 Workers who are altruistic and energetic are signi…cantly less likely to work in the public sector with an estimated probability of working in the public sector of 27.1%. This probability does not di¤er signi…cantly (p > 0:10) from the corresponding probability for workers who are sel…sh and lazy, who face a predicted probability of working in the public sector of 25.7%. Workers who are sel…sh and energetic are least likely to sort to the public sector, with an estimated probability of 20%.
Recent literature suggests that intrinsic motivation is a more important determinant of sorting to the public sector for higher educated workers Frank 2002, Dur and Zoutenbier 2010) . We …nd evidence in line with these studies for altruism and laziness. Table 4 shows the regression results for subsamples of each category of education. 13 Neither a worker's altruism nor laziness has a signi…cant e¤ect on sector of employment for workers with less than high school education. We do …nd some evidence for sorting of altruistic workers to the public sector among high-school graduates. We …nd the strongest results for workers in the highest education category. A unit increase in altruism increases the likelihood of working in the public sector for a highly educated worker by 3.9 percentage points, while a unit increase in laziness increases the likelihood of working in the public sector for a highly educated worker by 1.8 percentage points. A possible reason why altruism matters more for the sorting of higher educated workers lies in the nature of their job, with higher educated workers having more opportunities to make a 11 One possible interpretation for the insigini…cant coe¢ cient for the interaction term together with the signi…cant coe¢ cient for altruism is that public sector employees'contribution to society is (partly) independent of their e¤ort. For instance, public sector employees may consider the wage gap between the private sector and the public sector as a donation to society. This interpretation …ts well with Perry and Wise (1990)'s classic typology of public service motivation that includes both the "desire to serve" as well as the "desire to participate", where the former depends on a worker's e¤ort while the latter does not. A recent economic model including both types of public service motivation is Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) . 12 Predicted probabilities are calculated given the mean values of all control variables. Signi…cance levels (p < 0:01) are calculated using delta method standard errors. 13 As in the full sample, we do not …nd signi…cant interaction e¤ects in the subsamples and therefore report regressions estimates without interaction. signi…cant contribution to society in a public sector job. Laziness may matter more for the sorting of higher educated workers because in Germany extrinsic rewards for performance are generally rare among less educated workers and more prevalent among better educated workers (see tables 3 and 4 in Dur et al. 2010). We …nd some further support for this interpretation from our result that risk aversion only matters for sector of employment of the highly educated workers. The signs and signi…cance of the other control variables are fairly similar across all levels of education, aside from risk aversion.
Next, we examine heterogeneity in sorting to the public sector between industries. Relatively many jobs in the public sector involve taking care for people. Our estimates of sorting to the public sector may be confounded if altruistic (and/or lazy) workers have a particular tendency to take a job in the caring industry. Following Gregg et al. (2011), we have constructed two subsamples: the caring industries and the non-caring industries.
14 Table 5 reports the regression results for these subsamples. While the coe¢ cients for laziness hardly di¤er between industries, there is a big di¤erence between industries in sorting of altruistic workers to the public sector. As compared to the full sample, the sorting of altruistic workers to the public sector is much stronger in the caring industries and is virtually absent in the noncaring industries. These results nicely …t with those of Gregg et al. (2011) for the UK.
Lastly, we explore whether the sorting patterns that we have found are more or less pronounced for more experienced employees. As discussed in the Introduction, sorting may be related to work experience for two important reasons. First, at the start of people's career, 'job shopping'may be prevalent, with many people holding jobs that are not a good match with their tastes and abilities (Johnson 1978 , Jovanovic 1979 , and Neal 1999 . As a result, we would expect weak sorting patterns for employees with short work experience, as self-selection to good matches takes time. Second, employees' preferences may adapt to experience, for instance as a result of organizational socialization (Brewer 2008 ). Such preference adaption may result in stronger or weaker sorting patterns depending on how entrants'attitudes di¤er from the prevailing organizational culture. In Table 6 , we show the results of regressions that include an interaction of altruism and work experience, and of laziness and work experience (measured in years). 15 The …rst column shows that a unit increase in altruism for workers with no work experience, results in a positive and signi…cant e¤ect of 2.7 percentage points on the likelihood of working in the public sector. This suggests that altruistic workers already at the start of their career self-select to the public sector. The interaction e¤ect of altruism and work experience is negative, suggesting that the e¤ect of altruism on the likelihood of working in the public sector is smaller for workers with higher levels of work experience. This result is in line with a number of previous studies (Blau 1960 The second column allows the e¤ect of altruism to depend nonlinearly on work experience. These estimates imply that, even though the e¤ect of a worker's altruism declines with work experience in the …rst few years of a worker's career, the e¤ect increases in the last years of a worker's career, as illustrated in Figure 3 . Hence, overall, there is not a very clear relation between a worker's altruism and his work experience. Public sector employees are more altruistic as compared to their private sector counterparts at the start of their career, and by and large it remains like this throughout their career. For laziness, we do …nd a striking pattern. Column 1 shows that the e¤ect of a unit increase in laziness for workers with low levels of work experience is insigni…cant and very close to zero. However, the e¤ect of laziness is positive and signi…cant for workers with higher levels of work experience. The second column adds an interaction between a worker's laziness and work experience squared. As illustrated in Figure 4 , these estimates imply that a worker's laziness becomes more important for sorting as work experience increases. Whether this stems from preference adaption or delayed self-selection cannot be assessed due to the cross-sectional nature of our data. 16 Results from Table 7 provide some further evidence for self-selection. Here we look at workers who started their career only after their altruism and laziness had been measured. That is, we look at workers who started their career between 2005 and 2010. 17 This certainly precludes any feedback e¤ects from working in a particular sector on personality traits, but does pose di¢ culties in obtaining a su¢ ciently large sample size. Table 7 shows very similar results in sign and magnitude as compared to the estimates for workers with low levels of work experience in Table 6 . However, we do not …nd statistically signi…cant results, which could well be due to the very limited sample size.
Concluding remarks
We have studied how intrinsic motivations of public sector employees compare to those of private sector employees using a representative sample of German workers. In line with our theoretical predictions, we have found that public sector employees are signi…cantly more altruistic than private sector employees. This di¤erence is already present at the start of people's career and is more pronounced among highly educated employees and in caring industries. We have also found that public sector employees are signi…cantly more lazy than private sector employees. This di¤erence only shows up for more experienced employees, which could be due to early-career 'job shopping' or to preference adaption. Lastly, we did not …nd evidence for our theoretical prediction of a negative interaction between altruism and laziness in the sorting to the public sector, which may indicate that public sector employees'contribution to society is (partly) independent of their effort. Together these results imply that workers who are both highly altruistic and lazy have the highest likelihood of sorting to the public sector (with a predicted probability of 33%), whereas sel…sh and highly energetic workers have the lowest likelihood of sorting to the public sector (with a predicted probability of 20%).
A natural next step would be to include wages in the empirical analysis, as in the endogenous switching regression models by Van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1988), Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993) , and Dustmann and Van Soest (1998). Our theory predicts that wages in the private sector decrease in a worker's laziness and are independent of his altruism, whereas public sector wages are ‡at. It would be interesting to learn how much of the di¤er-ences in personality characteristics between public sector and private sector employees that we have found in this study can be attributed to di¤erences in the wage returns to altruism and laziness between sectors. Such a study does pose the challenge of …nding variables that are credibly exogenous to wage determination but not to selection (or the other way around). Notes: Correlations calculated using 10574 observations. *,**,*** indicate signi…cance at respectively 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level. 
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